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Abstract
We add a resale stage to standard auctions with two bidders. Bids are
either kept secret or made public. Either the auction winner or the auction
loser chooses the resale price. We characterize an inﬁnity of equilibria of
the second-price auction and a unique equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction.
For every equilibrium of an auction without bid disclosure, we construct an
outcome-equivalent and, in the case of the second-price auction, “posterior
implementable” equilibrium of the auction with bid disclosure. We compare
the revenues from the two auctions and from the two bargaining procedures
at resale.
1First-Price and Second-Price Auctions with Resale
1. Introduction
Most theoretical models of auction forbid resale between bidders. How-
ever, resale is, at least, possible after many real-life auctions. Documented
examples include auctions of bonds, bills, foreign exchange, timber rights,
SO2 emission allowances, radio-wave spectrum licences, and gold.
We consider the standard independent private value model with two,
possibly heterogeneous, bidders. To the ﬁrst- and second-price auctions, we
add a stage where resale between bidders may occur. At resale, either the
auction winner or the auction loser makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. The
auctions are either sealed, in which case bids are kept secret before resale
and payments in the second-price auction are deferred until after resale, or
open, in which case bids are made public before resale. Obviously, since the
payment is often revealed immediately after or during the auction, assuming
only with secret bids would be inadequate to many applications. Our results
apply as well to intermediate assumptions on the release of bids; for example,
to the Dutch auction, where only the higher bid is revealed, and to the English
auction, where only the lower bid is revealed.
We link these auctions with resale to auctions with (pure) common value.
In any equilibrium, the bidders’ net values for winning the auction are iden-
tical when their bids are identical. From this link, we obtain and explicitly
characterize an inﬁnity of equilibria of the second-price auction and a unique
equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction. In general, these equilibria are pure for
sealed-bid auctions and “mixed,” or, more correctly, “behavioral,” for open
auctions. Surprisingly enough, for every equilibrium of a sealed-bid auction,
there exists an “outcome-equivalent” equilibrium of the open auction.
The usual “truth-bidding” equilibrium of the second-price auction with-
out resale remains an equilibrium if resale is allowed. However, resale de-
2stroys its weak-dominance (as Gupta and Lebrun 1999 noticed)1 and allows
an inﬁnity of (ineﬃcient) equilibria. All our equilibria of the open second-
price auction are “posterior implementable,” that is, no bidder would regret
his bid upon learning the other bidder’s bid.
In the case with heterogenous bidders, we prove, by examining the ﬁnal
equilibrium allocations, that some equilibria of the second-price auction bring
more revenues to the auctioneer that the equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction
and that some others bring less.
Although the equilibrium bid distributions of the ﬁrst-price auctions with
diﬀerent bargaining procedures cannot be stochastically ranked, we show,
again by focusing on the ﬁnal allocations, that the auctioneer’s revenues are
higher when the price setter at resale is the auction winner.
Contrary to Gupta and Lebrun (1999), where all private information is
exogenously released after the auction, only endogenous release of informa-
tion, through the auction outcome and bids, occurs in our model. Assuming
resale under complete information as in Gupta and Lebrun (1999) would
make the link with the common-value model immediate. Resale would rem-
edy any ineﬃciency and bidders’ net values for winning the auction would
be equal to the resale price. In the present paper, information is incomplete
at resale and, as is expected from Myerson and Satterwhaite (1983), not all
ineﬃciencies are remedied after the auction. Nevertheless, in asymmetric
equilibria, resale does take place and bidders’ net values coincide when bids
are identical. We show that this commonality of net values for identical or
“pivotal” bids is enough to extend standard results from the common-value
model.
Tröger (2003) and Garratt and Tröger (2003, 2005) add to the standard
symmetric model one “speculator”—a bidder whose only interest is in reselling
the item. In our paper, both bidders have also a “use value” for the item.
Garatt and Tröger do not consider the link with common-value model, nor
1It is the only ex-post equilibrium, see Krishna and Hafalir (2006).
3general comparisons between equilibrium payoﬀs.
In a similar augmented symmetric model, Bose and Deltas (2004) show
the presence of a winner’s curse in auctions between speculators and one ﬁnal
consumer, even when, as they assume, the speculators are not allowed to act
on the information they gather at auction. In our paper, the presence of
a winner’s curse is made obvious through our link with the common-value
model.
When bidders observe only noisy signals of their use values before the
auction, Haile (2000) assumes that information becomes complete before re-
sale. He obtains a model with aﬃliated exogenous net values, to which he
can apply Milgrom and Weber (1982)’s methods. In a similar model with
private uncertainty, Haile (2003) also addresses resale under incomplete infor-
mation and obtains formulas for the pure symmetric separating equilibrium,
conditional on its existence.
Using calculus of variation, Krishna and Hafalir (2006) show that, no
matter the bargaining procedure at resale2, the unique equilibrium of the
ﬁrst-price auction brings more revenues to the auctioneer than the truth-
bidding equilibrium of the second-price auction. Krishna and Hafalir (2006)
examine only the secret-bid case and do not oﬀer comparative statics results
pertaining to a change of the bargaining procedure. They exhibit, in a few
examples, equilibria diﬀerent from the truth-bidding equilibrium, but do not
oﬀer a general characterization.
Milgrom (1987) considers resale in auctions with complete information
throughout. Pagnozzi (2005) shows that resale may occur at the equilibrium
of a second-price auction that awards a project with random cost to one of
two heterogenous bidders, one with limited liability and none with private
information.
Optimal mechanism design under the presence of resale has been studied
2In addition to our two ultimatums procedures, Krishna and Hafalir (2006) also consider
“intermediate” procedures where the price setter at resale is chosen at random according
to exogenous probabilities.
4in Zheng (2002), Calzolari and Pavan (2003), and Lebrun (2005).
2. Sealed-Bid Auctions
Bidder 1 and bidder 2’s use values for the item being auctioned are inde-
pendently distributed over the same interval [c,d],w i t hc<d ,a c c o r d i n gt o
absolutely continuous probability measures F1 and F2 with density functions
f1 and f2 that are strictly positive and continuous3. W eu s et h es a m en o -
tations F1 and F2 for the cumulative distribution functions. A bidder’s use
value is his own private information.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is no reserve price and
that participation to the auction is mandatory4. Bids are not revealed before
resale. If, as it is natural, the winner of the second-price auction learns the
price when he pays it, payment to the auctioneer has to be deferred until
after the resale stage.
Resale takes place at the resale stage if and only if the price setter proposes
a resale price the other bidder agrees to. We ﬁrst deﬁne a regular equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1:
(i) A regular bidding function βi of bidder i is a strictly increasing
and continuous function from [c,d] to [c,+∞).
(ii) If the auction winner (loser) is the price-setter at resale, a reg-
ular resale-oﬀer function γi of bidder i is a real-valued, bounded, and mea-
surable5 function deﬁned over [c,d]×[c,+∞) and such that γi (v;b) ≥(≤)v,
for all (v;b) in [c,d] × [c,+∞).
3Many of our results hold true under more general assumptions that allow, for example,
density functions that are deﬁned and strictly positive only over (c,d] ( a sl o n ga st h e ya r e
bounded).
4Our equilibria remain equilibria if participation is voluntary. Our results about the
second-price auction easily extend to the case with an arbitrary reserve price.
5As everywhere in this paper, with respect to the σ-algebras of Borel subsets.
5(iii) A regular strategy of bidder i is a couple σi =( βi,γi) where βi
is a regular bidding function and γi ar e g u l a rr e s a l e - o ﬀer function.
(iv) A regular equilibrium (σ1,σ2)=( β1,γ1;β2,γ2) is a couple of
regular strategies that can be completed6 into a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
If bidder i with use value vi follows (βi,γi),h eb i d sβi (vi) at auction and
oﬀers the resale price γi (v;bi) at resale when he is the price setter and when
he has submitted bi at auction.
We then deﬁne the optimal-resale-price functions ρs and ρb as follows.
Deﬁnition 2:
(i) For all i =1 ,2, the buyer’s virtual-use-value function ωb
i and the
seller’s virtual-use-value function ωs
i are deﬁned over [c,d] as follows:
ω
b
i (vi)=vi −
1 − Fi (vi)
fi (vi)
;ω
s
i (vi)=vi +
Fi (vi)
fi (vi)
.
(ii) Let ωb
i (ωs
i) be strictly increasing over [c,d],f o ri =1 ,2.L e t t h e
seller (buyer)’s optimal-resale-price function ρs (ρb) be the function deﬁned
over [c,d]
2 such that, for all (w1,w 2) in [c,d]
2, its value at (w1,w 2) is equal
to the unique solution of the equation below:
wk = ρ
x (w1,w 2) −
Fl(wl) − Fl(ρx (w1,w 2))
fl(ρx (w1,w 2))
,( 1 )
where x = s (b)a n dk and l are such that l 6= k and wk ≤ (≥) wl.
(iii) Notation:
ρx
1 (v,w)=ρx
2 (w,v)=ρx (v,w), for all (v,w) in [c1,d 1]×[c2,d 2]
and x = s,b.
In Deﬁnition 2 (ii), ρs (w1,w 2) (ρb (w1,w 2)) is the resale price that maxi-
mizes bidder k’s expected payoﬀ when bidder k’s use value is wk and bidder
6By adding beliefs and by adding what responses every bidder should give to oﬀers
from the other bidder at resale, as functions of the past observed histories.
6l’s use value is distributed according to Fl conditionally on belonging to the
interval [c,wl] ([wl,d]). That equation (1) has a unique solution follows eas-
ily from the strict monotonicity of ω
y
i, y 6= x. A c c o r d i n gt ot h en o t a t i o n
(iii), ρx
i is the function ρx w h e r ew ew r i t eb i d d e ri’s use value as the ﬁrst
argument.
In Theorems 1 and 2 below, as everywhere in this paper, β
−1
i denotes the
“extended” inverse of βi that takes the constant value d above the range of
βi.
Theorem 1: Let x,y be s or b and such that x 6= y.L e t ω
y
1 and ω
y
2 be
strictly increasing. Let ϕ be a strictly increasing continuous function over
[c,d] such that ϕ(c)=c and ϕ(d)=d.L e t (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) be the following
couple of regular strategies:
β1 (v)=ρ
x (v,ϕ(v)),
β2 (v)=ρ
x ¡
ϕ
−1(v),v
¢
,
for all v in [c,d];
γi (v;b)=ρ
s
i (vi,max(vi,α j (b))),i fx = s,
γi (v;b)=ρ
b
i (vi,min(vi,α j (b))),i fx = b,
where αi = β
−1
i , i =1 ,2,f o ra l l(v,b) in [c,d]×[c,+∞).T h e n , (β1,γ1;β2,γ2)
is a regular equilibrium of the second-price auction where payments are de-
ferred and bids are kept secret and where the price setter at resale is the
auction winner if x = s and the auction loser if x = b. Moreover, the
following equalities hold true:
α2β1 = ϕ,(2)
ρ
x (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) = b,
7for all v in [c,d] and b in [β1 (c),β1 (d)] = [β2 (c),β2 (d)] = [c,d].
Since there is an inﬁnity of functions ϕ as in Theorem 1, the sealed-
bid second-price auction with resale has, like the common-value auction, an
inﬁnity of equilibria. From (2) above, ϕ determines the “intermediate”
equilibrium allocation, that is, the allocation after the auction and before
resale.
If ϕ is the identity function, every bidder submits at equilibrium his
use value. Since the auction eﬃciently allocates the item between bidders,
no resale takes place in this equilibrium. It is outcome-equivalent to the
equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies of the second-price auction with no
resale allowed. Of course, this equivalence no longer holds true for equilibria
constructed from functions ϕ diﬀerent from the identity function.
Theorem 2: Let x,y be s or b and such that x 6= y.L e t ω
y
1 and ω
y
2
be strictly increasing. Let (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) be the following couple of regular
strategies:
βi (v)=
R Fi(v)
0 ρx ¡
F
−1
1 (q),F
−1
2 (q)
¢
dq
Fi (v)
(3)
for all v in [c,d];
γi (v;b)=ρ
s
i (vi,max(vi,α j (b))),i fx = s,
γi (v;b)=ρ
b
i (vi,min(vi,α j (b))),i fx = b,
where αi = β
−1
i , i =1 ,2,f o ra l l(v,b) in [c,d]×[c,+∞).T h e n , (β1,γ1;β2,γ2)
is a regular equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction where bids are kept secret
and where the price setter at resale is the auction winner if x = s and the
auction loser if x = b. The following equality holds true:
α2β1 = F
−1
2 F1.(4)
8Moreover, β1,β2 are the unique bidding functions that are diﬀerentiable over
(c,d] and part of a regular equilibrium.
From Gupta and Lebrun (1999), the equilibrium bidding functions (3) are
the same as in the simple model where private information becomes public
before resale and the resale price is exogenously determined according to
ρx. As (4) indicates, the bids are distributed identically across bidders.
Indeed, from Gupta and Lebrun (1999), the same bid distributions arise at
the equilibrium of the symmetric model where both bidders’ use values are
distributed according to Gx such that (Gx)
−1 (q)=ρx ¡
F
−1
1 (q),F
−1
2 (q)
¢
,f o r
all q in [0,1].
The intuition for the theorems above and the main argument of their
proofs come from a link, we now describe, between our model and the
common-value model. Assume that β1,β2 are the bidding strategies the
bidders are expected to follow at auction. Bidder i’s updated beliefs about
bidder j’s use value after winning (losing) the auction with a bid bi are
represented by the conditional of Fj on [c,αj (bi)] ([αj (bi),d]). Then,
γi (vi;bi)=ρs
i (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))) (ρb
i (vi,min(vi,α j (b)))), as in Theorem
1, is the smallest (largest) resale price that maximizes his expected payoﬀ.
Assume that the bidders choose their resale prices according to these resale-
oﬀer functions. Then, the bidders’ net values for winning will be as in
Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1: Let x,y be s or b a n ds u c ht h a tx 6= y.L e t ω
y
1 and
ω
y
2 be strictly increasing. Assume bidder i expects bidder j to follow a
regular bidding function βj, for all i 6= j. Assume bidder i oﬀers the
resale price according to the optimal regular resale-oﬀer function γi such
that γi (v;b)=ρs
i (v,max(v,αj (b))) (ρb
i (v,min(v,αj (b))))i f x = s (b), for
all i =1 ,2 and (v,b) in [c,d]×[c,+∞).T h e n , b i d d e r i’s net-value function
ux
i,t h a ti s ,t h ed i ﬀerence between his utility u
x,w
i when winning (gross of the
9auction price) and his utility u
x,l
i when losing is as follows:
u
s
i
¡
vi,v j;bi,b j;βi,βj
¢
= ρ
s
i (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))),i fn o tl a r g e rt h a nvj;
= ρ
s
j (vj,max(vj,α i (bj))),i fn o tl a r g e rt h a nvi;
= vi, otherwise;
u
b
i
¡
vi,v j;bi,b j;βi,βj
¢
= ρ
b
i (vi,min(vi,α j (bi))), if not smaller than vj;
= ρ
b
j (vj,min(vj,α i (bj))), if not smaller than vi;
= vi, otherwise;
for all couple of bids (b1,b 2) in [c,+∞)
2, couple of use values (v1,v 2) in
[c,d]
2,a n di,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j.
When resale could take place at the price one of the two bidders would
oﬀer, bidder i’s net value is equal to the resale price: by winning bidder i
saves the resale price if he would be a buyer at resale and earns it if he would
be a reseller. Otherwise, bidder i’s net value is, as when resale is forbidden,
equal to his use value: winning secures him the item, which he could not have
obtained at resale. Since it depends, through their inverses, on the bidding
functions the bidders are expected to follow, the net value is “endogenous.”
When looking for regular equilibria in the case x = s (b), we may, as we
do below, focus on bidder i’s expected utility up to his expected utility from
losing (winning) with probability one. In fact, since bidder j, j 6= i,d o e s
not observe bi when he makes an oﬀer at resale, bidder i’s utility u
s,l
i (ub.w
i )
when losing (winning) does not depend on his bid bi.
Since bidder i’s bid bi can enter his net value only as an argument of
his resale price, which, we have assumed, he chooses optimally, b0
i = bi is a
10solution of the maximization problem below:
bi ∈ argmax
b0
i≥c
Z αj(bi)
e
u
x
i
¡
vi,v j;b
0
i,βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
dFj (vj),( 5 )
where e = c if x = s and e = d if s = b. By applying the integral form of (a
variant of) the envelope theorem in Milgrom and Segal (2002) to this problem,
we prove in Appendix 1 Lemma 2 (i) below, which allows to circumvent the
direct dependence of ux
i on the own bid bi. We also prove in Appendix 1 the
rest of Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: Let x,y be s or b and such that x 6= y.L e t ω
y
1 and ω
y
2 be
strictly increasing. Assume bidder i expects bidder j to follow the regular
bidding function βj, for all i 6= j. For all i =1 ,2,l e tux
i be bidder i’s
net-value function as deﬁned in Lemma 1. Then, for all i 6= j:
(i)—Envelope Result: For all (vi,b i) in [c,d] × [c,+∞),
Z αj(bi)
e
u
x
i
¡
vi,v j;bi,βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
dFj (vj)
=
Z αj(bi)
e
u
x
i
¡
vi,v j;βj (vj),βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
dFj (vj),
where e = c if x = s and e = d if x = b.
(ii)—Common Value for Identical Bids when Bidding as Expected:
For all b ≥ c,
u
x
1 (α1 (b),α 2 (b);b,b;β1,β2)=u
x
2 (α1 (b),α 2 (b);b,b;β1,β2)=ρ
x (α1 (b),α 2 (b)).
(iii)—Monotonicity with respect to Own Type: For all b ≥ c, ux
i
¡
vi,α j (b);b,b;βi,βj
¢
is nondecreasing with respect to vi in [c,d].
Optimal resale under incomplete information at least remedies the “worst
cases” of ineﬃciency, where, given a price setter’s use value, the other bidder’s
11use value is as far away as possible, that is, when both bidders submit the
same bid. Then, as stated in Lemma 2 (ii), the equality between both bidders’
net values and the resale price, which always holds true under complete
information (as in Gupta and Lebrun, 1999), also holds true in those cases.
Theorems 1 and 2 follow easily fromL e m m a2 . I n d e e d ,f r o mL e m m a2
(i), bidder i’s expected net payoﬀs when his use value is vi a n dh i sb i di sb
a r ea sf o l l o w s .
Expected Net Payoﬀ in the Second-Price Auction:
Z αj(b)
e
u
x
i
¡
vi,v j;βj (vj),βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
dFj (vj) −
Z αj(b)
c
βj (vj)dFj (vj);( 6 )
Expected Net Payoﬀ in the First-Price Auction:
Z αj(b)
e
u
x
i
¡
vi,v j;βj (vj),βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
dFj (vj) −
Z αj(b)
c
bdFj (vj);( 7 )
where e = c if x = s and e = d if x = b.
Since, at an equilibrium, b should be optimal if vi = αi (b),w eo b t a i n
from Lemma 2 (ii) the following ﬁrst-order conditions.
First-Order Equilibrium Condition in the Second-Price Auction:
ρ
x (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) = b.( 8 )
First-Order Equilibrium Conditions in the First-Price Auction (if the bid-
ding functions are diﬀerentiable):
d
db
lnFi (αi (b)) =
1
ρx (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) − b
, i =1 ,2.( 9 )
The same ﬁrst-order conditions (9) would follow from any other choice
12of optimal regular resale-oﬀer functions. From Gupta and Lebrun (1999),
the bidding functions described in Theorem 2 form the unique solution of
the two conditions (9)7. As in the common-value second-price auction,
the multiplicity of equilibria described in Theorem 1 ensues from the single
condition (8). From Lemma 2 (iii), the “second-order” condition is satisﬁed
for both auction procedures and the expected net payoﬀ, which is then quasi-
concave with respect to the bid, reaches its maximum at the bid the bidding
function speciﬁes.
Corollary 1 below describes a property of the equilibria we will use in the
following section to construct equivalent behavioral equilibria of the open
auctions.
Corollary 1: Let (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) be a regular equilibrium as in Theorem
1 or Theorem 2 and let ϕ be equal to α2β1.L e t ϕ+ and ϕ− be the functions
deﬁned over [c,d] as follows:
ϕ
+ (v)=m i n {w ∈ [v,d]|ϕ(w)=w}
ϕ
− (v)=m a x {w ∈ [c,v]|ϕ(w)=w}.
If the price setter at resale is the auction winner, then all bids in
£
β1(ϕ
− (v)),ρ
s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (v)
¤
are optimal for bidder 1 (2) with use value v in [c,d] such that ϕ(v) <(>)v.
If the price setter at resale is the auction loser, then all bids in
£
ρ
b (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (v),β1(ϕ
+ (v))
¤
are optimal for bidder 1 (2) with use value v in [c,d] such that ϕ(v) >(<)v.
For example, assume the price setter at resale is the auction winner and
7Together with the immediate boundary condition β1 (d)=β2 (d).
13ϕ(v) >v ,t h a ti s ,β1 (v) >β 2 (v) (the proof is similar in the other cases).
Since bidder 2 with use value v wins the auction only if bidder 1’s use value
is smaller v, no trade could occur with bidder 2 as the price setter. Let b
be a bid in
¡
β1(ϕ− (v)),ρ s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (v)
¢
,w h e r eϕ− (v) is the largest
point of coincidence between the bidding functions to the left of v. Then,
α1 (b) <α 2 (b) and ρs (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) < min(v,α2 (b)).
By continuity, there exists a neighborhood of α1 (b) such that, for all
v1 in this neighborhood, ρs (v1,α 2 (β1 (v1))) is smaller than v and α2 (b)
and is thus, from Lemma 1, equal to us
2 (v1,v;β1 (v1),β1 (v1);β1,β2) and
us
1 (v1,α 2 (b);β1 (v1),β1 (v1);β1,β2), both. Consequently, from (6) and (7),
the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of a bid change from b on bidder 2’s expected payoﬀ when
h i su s ev a l u ei sv i st h es a m ea sw h e nh i su s ev a l u ei sα2 (b).S i n c e , b y t h e
equilibrium condition, this ﬁrst-order eﬀect vanishes, bidder 2’s expected pay-
oﬀ must be constant over the closure of
¡
β1(ϕ− (v)),ρ s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (v)
¢
.
The equilibrium bid β2 (v) belongs to this interval and, consequently, all bids
in it are optimal.
Intuitively, when bidder 2 is not the price setter and would accept the
resale oﬀer from the other bidder, the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of a bid change is
determined by the resale price and hence is independent on bidder 2’s use
value. Since the bid is optimal for a certain use value, the ﬁrst-order eﬀect
vanishes throughout.
For the second-price auction, the set of optimal bids in the example above
is simply, from Theorem 1, [ϕ− (v),v].
From Theorem 2, the function ϕ in Corollary 1 is F
−1
2 F1 for the ﬁrst-price
auction.
Corollary 2 below characterizes the ﬁnal, that is, after resale, equilibrium
allocations.
Corollary 2: Let (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) be a regular equilibrium as in Theorem
1o rT h e o r e m2a n dl e tϕ be equal to α2β1.L e t x be s (b) if the price setter
at resale is the auction winner (loser). Let λ
x
ϕ be the function deﬁned over
14[c,d] as follows:
λ
s
ϕ (v1)=ρ
s (v1,ϕ(v1)),i fϕ(v1) ≥ v1;
λ
s
ϕ (v1)=ρ
s ¡
ϕ
−1 (.),.
¢−1 (v1),i fϕ(v1) ≤ v1;
λ
b
ϕ (v1)=ρ
b (v1,ϕ(v1)),i fϕ(v1) ≤ v1;
λ
b
ϕ (v1)=ρ
b ¡
ϕ
−1 (.),.
¢−1 (v1),i fϕ(v1) ≥ v1.
If bidder 1’s and bidder 2’s use values v1,v 2 in [c,d] are such that v2 <(>)λ
x
ϕ (v1),
then the equilibrium eventually allocates the item to bidder 1 (2).
The proof is simple. For example, assume x = s and ϕ(v1) ≥ v1.
From the deﬁnitions of ϕ and λ
s
ϕ,w eh a v eλ
s
ϕ (v1) ≤ ϕ(v1)=α2β1 (v1).I f
v2 <λ
s
ϕ (v1), bidder 2 loses the auction and refuses bidder 1’s resale oﬀer. If
λ
s
ϕ (v1) <v 2 <ϕ(v1), bidder 2 loses the auction and accepts bidder 1’s resale
oﬀer. If ϕ(v1) <v 2, bidder 2 wins the auction and no advantageous resale
is possible.
3. Open Auctions
We now turn to the auctions where bids are publicly revealed prior to
resale. We need to extend our deﬁnition of a regular equilibrium by allowing
behavioral strategies.
Deﬁnition 3:
(i) A regular bidding strategy Gi (.|.) is a regular conditional proba-
bility measure with respect to vi in [c,d].
(ii) A regular strategy is a couple (Gi (.|.),δ i) where Gi (.|.) is a
regular bidding strategy and δi is a regular resale-oﬀer function, as deﬁned
in Deﬁnition 1 (ii).
15(iii) Bidder i’s regular beliefs are represented by a regular conditional
probability measure Fj (.|.) with respect to bj in [c,+∞).
(iv) A regular equilibrium is a couple of regular strategies and a cou-
ple of regular beliefs (G1 (.|.),δ1,F 2 (.|.);G2 (.|.),δ2,F 1 (.|.)) that can be com-
pleted into a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
If bidder i with use value vi follows (Gi (.|.),δi), he chooses his bid ac-
cording to Gi (.|vi) and, if he is the price setter and bidder j bids bj,h e
oﬀers δi (vi;bj) at resale. Here, contrary to the previous section, the second
argument of δi is bidder j’s bid. The measure Fj (.|bj) represents the revised
beliefs bidder i holds about bidder j’s use value after having observed bidder
j’s bid bj. We have Corollary 3 below.
Corollary 3: Let E be a regular equilibrium of a sealed-bid auction
as in Theorem 1 or Theorem 2 (Section 2). Then, there exists a regular
equilibrium E0 of the open auction such that:
(i) The bid marginal distributions, the interim total expected payoﬀs,
and the ﬁn a la l l o c a t i o na r et h es a m ea si nE;
(ii) Conditionally on the use value of the price setter at resale, resale
takes place with the same probability as in E and, when this probability is
diﬀerent from zero, at the same price;
(iii) If the auction is the second-price auction, the auction outcomes—
the bids and the allocation before resale—are posterior implemented by E0.
From (i) and (ii), for every regular equilibrium of a sealed-bid auction,
there exists an “equivalent” regular equilibrium of the open auction. Fol-
lowing Green and Laﬀont (1987) (see, also, Lopomo 2001), (iii) means that
all bids in the support of bidder i’s bidding strategy conditional on vi are
optimal for bidder i with use value vi even after he learns bidder j’s bid.
Let E =( β1,γ1;β2,γ2) be a regular equilibrium as in Theorem 1 or
Theorem 2. We prove Corollary 3 by constructing an equilibrium E0 =
16(G1 (.|.),δ 1,F 2 (.|.);G2 (.|.),δ2,F 1 (.|.)) with the required properties. The
construction proceeds into the following four steps.
Step 1. Construction of the supports: If, conditionally on his use value
vi, no resale could occur with bidder i as the price setter, the support of
Gi (.|vi) is the interval of optimal bids described in Corollary 1 (Section 2).
Otherwise, the support of Gi (.|vi) is {βi (vi)}.
Step 2. Construction of revised beliefs F1 (.|.) and F2 (.|.) that are con-
sistent with the supports in Step 1 and such that, when advantageous resale
is possible, the price setter ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀe rt h es a m er e s a l ep r i c eh e
oﬀers in E.
Step 3. Construction of the bidding strategy Gi (.|.) as the conditional
distribution of the bid with respect to the use value from the joint distribution
of the use-value-bid couples generated by the marginal Fiαi of bidder i’s bid
in E and the conditional Fi (.|.) from Step 2, for all i =1 ,2.
Step 4. Extension of the construction of optimal regular resale-oﬀer func-
tions from the domains in Step 2, where resale is possible, to the whole deﬁ-
nition domain [c,d]×[c,+∞) such that, when the price setter is the auction
winner (loser), the resale oﬀer does not depend on the bid from the auction
loser (winner) along the equilibrium path.
Step 1 is a simple deﬁnition. To show that Step 2 can be carried out,
assume x = s and there exists v such that ϕ(v) >vand consider b2 in
(β2 (ϕ− (v)),β2 (ϕ+ (v))) (see Figure 1). From Step 1 and Corollary 1 (Sec-
tion 2), the support of F2 (.|b2) must be I =[ ρs (α1 (b2),α 2 (b2)),ϕ + (v)].I n
order for bidder 1 with use value v1 = α1
¡
ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢
,w i t h
w in I, to propose the same resale price w as in E,i tm u s tm a x i m i z e
(w − v1)(1− F2 (w|b2)) and hence satisfy (assuming diﬀerentiability) the ﬁrst-
order condition below:
d
dw
ln(1 − F2 (w|b2)) =
1
α1
¡
ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢
− w
.( 1 0 )
17If this necessary ﬁrst-order condition is satisﬁed for all w in the interior of
I, it will also be suﬃcient (since w +
1−F2(w|b2)
f2(w|b2) will then be equal to the
increasing function α1
¡
ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢
). Integrating this equation
in w from the lower extremity of I to v2 in the interior of I,w eﬁnd:
F2 (v2|b2)=1− exp
Z v2
ρs(α1(b2),α2(b2))
1
α1
¡
ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢
− w
dw.( 1 1 )
This equation deﬁnes indeed a probability distribution over I since the limit
of its right-hand side tends towards one as v2 tends towards ϕ+ (v) (for the
proof, see Appendix 2).
Step 3 leads to a bidding strategy of bidder i if and only if the marginal
distribution F∗
i of the joint distribution generated by Fi (.|.) and Fiαi is
equal to the actual distribution Fi of bidder i’s use value. To show that
this is indeed the case, assume, as in the previous paragraph, that x = s
and there exists v such that ϕ(v) >v(see Figure 1). From Step 2, (10) or,
equivalently, (12) below holds true, for all w in (ϕ− (v),ϕ + (v)) and all b2 in
£
β2 (ϕ− (v)),ρ s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¤
:
¡
w − α1
¡
ρ
s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢¢
f2 (w|b2)=1− F2 (w|b2),( 1 2 )
where f2 (.|b2) denotes the derivative of F2 (.|b2). Integrating (12) in b2
according to F2α2 over
£
β2 (ϕ− (v)),ρ s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¤
,w eﬁnd (13)
below:
¡
w − α1
¡
ρ
s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢¢
f
∗
2 (w)=F2
¡
α2
¡
ρ
s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢¢
−F
∗
2 (w).( 1 3 )
However, from the obvious equality ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
¡
ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢
=
w,w eh a v e :
¡
w − α1
¡
ρ
s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢¢
f2 (w)=F2
¡
α2
¡
ρ
s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢¢
−F2 (w).( 1 4 )
18Subtracting (14) from (13), we ﬁnd:
d
dw
(F
∗
2 (w) − F2 (w)) =
F2 (w) − F∗
2 (w)
w − α1
¡
ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢.
From this diﬀerential equation, the diﬀerence F∗
2 −F2 either vanishes or is of
constant sign over the interval (ϕ− (v),ϕ + (v)).F r o m t h i s s a m e d i ﬀerential
equation, a constant sign implies strict monotonicity, which contradicts the
equality, from Step 2, between F∗
2 and F2 at both extremities of this inter-
val. Consequently, F∗
2 and F2 coincide everywhere and G2 (.|.) is a bidding
strategy of bidder 2.
FIGURE 1
Step 4 can be achieved by deﬁning the following continuous resale-oﬀer
functions:
δ
s
i (vi;bj)=m a x ( ρ
s
i (vi,α jβi (vi)),v i),i fbj ≤ βi (vi);
=m i n ( ρ
s (α1 (bj),α 2 (bj)),α j (bj)),i fbj >β i (vi).
δ
b
i (vi;bj)=m i n
¡
ρ
b
i (vi,α jβi (vi)),v i
¢
,i fbj ≥ βi (vi);
=m a x
¡
ρ
b (α1 (bj),α 2 (bj)),α j (bj)
¢
,i fbj <β i (vi).
The net value functions are then as in Lemma 3 below. Since we only
consider βi,βj from E, we drop them from the argument of ux
i.
Lemma 3: Let x,y be s or b such that x 6= y.L e t ω
y
1and ω
y
2 be
strictly increasing. Assume bidder i expects bidder j to follow the regular
bidding function βj, for all i 6= j. Assume further bidder i oﬀers the resale
price according to the resale-oﬀer function δ
x
i deﬁned above, for all i =1 ,2.
Then, bidder i’s net-value function ux
i,t h a ti s ,t h ed i ﬀerence between his
19utility u
x,w
i when winning and his utility u
x,l
i when losing is as follows:
u
s
i (vi,v j;bi,b j)
= δ
s
i (vi;bj), if not larger than vj;
= δ
s
j (vj;bi), if not larger than vi;
= vi, otherwise;
u
b
i (vi,v j;bi,b j)
= δ
b
i (vi;bj), if not smaller than vj;
= δ
b
j (vj;bi), if not smaller than vi;
= vi, otherwise;
for all couple of bids (b1,b 2) in [c,+∞)
2, couple of use values (v1,v 2) in
[c,d]
2,a n di,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j.
Lemma 2 (Section 2) then extends as follows to open auctions. Notice
the change of lower extremity in (i.2) with respect to the similar property
Lemma 2. Here, when x = s (b), the utility in case of winning (losing) u
s,w
i
(u
b,l
i ) does not depend on the own bid and we may compare the expected
utility to the expected utility from winning (losing) with probability one,
that is, for all use values of the opponent.
Lemma 4: Let x,y be s or b such that x 6= y.L e t ω
y
1and ω
y
2 be strictly
increasing. Let β1,β2 be regular bidding functions. For all i =1 ,2,l e tux
i
be bidder i’s net-value function as deﬁned in Lemma 3. Let i,j be such that
i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j.T h e n :
(i.1) For all (vi,b i) in [c,d] ×[c,+∞) and all bj ≥ (≤) bi if x = s
20(b):
Z
u
x
i (vi,v j;bi,b j)dFj (vj|bj)
=
Z
u
x
i (vi,v j;bj,b j)dFj (vj|bj)
(i.2) For all (vi,b i) in [c,d] × [c,+∞):
Z bi
e0
Z
u
x
i (vi,v j;bi,b j)dFj (vj|bj)dFjαj (bj)
=
Z bi
e0
Z
u
x
i (vi,v j;bj,b j)dFj (vj|bj)dFjαj (bj),
where e0 = d if x = s and e0 = c if x = b.
(ii) For all b ≥ c:
Z
u
x
i (αi (b),v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b)=ρ
x (α1 (b),α 2 (b)).
(iii) For all b ≥ c,
R
ux
i (vi,v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b) is nondecreasing with
respect to vi in [c,d].
From Lemma 3 and Step 4, the resale price and, thus, the net value of the
auction loser (winner) do not depend on his bid, when his opponent follows
the equilibrium strategy and x = s (b). (i.1) and (i.2) follow.
(ii) holds true because resale occurs with probability one when both bid-
ders submit the same bid b (and α1 (b) 6= α2 (b)). In fact, assume, for
example, x = s and α2 (b) >α 1 (b). Then, according to the revised beliefs,
bidder 1’s use value is α1 (b) and the minimum of the support of bidder 2’s
use value is ρs (α1 (b),α 2 (b)). With probability one bidder 1’s resale oﬀer
ρs (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) is accepted by bidder 2 and is equal to the bidders’ net
values.
21Bidder i obtains the conditional net expected payoﬀ
R
ux
i (vi,v j;bj,b j)dFj (vj|bj)
if he observes bj a n dp r o p o s e sh i so p t i m a lr e s a l ep r i c ew h e nh ei st h ep r i c e
setter. It is thus the maximum of the net expected payoﬀ he obtains when
he proposes pi, over all possible resale prices pi. Since, for any ﬁxed pi,h i s
net expected payoﬀ is nondecreasing in his use value vi, so will his optimal
net expected payoﬀ and (iii) follows.
From Lemma 4, proceeding as in Section 2, we obtain the same sets
of optimal bids. Since those sets are the supports of the bidding strategies
Gi (.|.), i =1 ,2, E0 in Corollary 3 is a regular equilibrium of the open auction.
From Lemma 4 (i.1), given the opponent’s bid, a bidder’s bid does not
aﬀect his net value for winning. In the second-price auction, a bidder’s bid
has obviously no eﬀect on the auction price when he wins. From Lemma
4a n dt h ee q u a l i t yρx (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) = b, any of a bidder’s equilibrium bids
in the second-price auction wins against bids that contribute nonnegatively
to his net expected payoﬀ and loses against those that contribute nonposi-
tively. He has thus no incentive to change his own bid, even if he learns his
opponent’s bid, and we have proved Corollary 3 (iii).
The ﬁnal allocation is the same in E
0 as in E. Assume, for exam-
ple, x = s and bidder 1’s use value v1 is such that ϕ(v1) ≥ v1,w h e r e
ϕ = α2β1. Then, bidder 1 bids β1 (v1).I f λ
s
ϕ is as deﬁn e di nC o r o l -
lary 2 (Section 2), we have v1 ≤ λ
s
ϕ (v1)=ρs (v1,ϕ(v1)) ≤ ϕ(v1).I f
v2 ≤ λ
s
ϕ (v1), Step 2 implies that bidder 2 with use value v2 bids at most
max
¡
β1 (ϕ− (v1)),ρ s (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (v2)
¢
, which is not larger than β1 (v1).
Consequently, bidder 2 loses the auction and refuses bidder 1’s oﬀer. If v2 ≥
λ
s
ϕ (v1), bidder 2 accepts bidder 1’s resale oﬀer when bidder 1 wins and there
is no proﬁtable resale when bidder 2 wins.
From Myerson (1981) (Lemma 2, p.63), the interim expected payoﬀsa r e
the same in E0 as in E. Because, by construction, the marginal bid distrib-
u t i o n sa r et h es a m e ,w eh a v ep r o v e dC o r o l l a r y3( i ) .
Since, from Step 1, a bidder who can be a price setter at resale submits
22the same bid, his interim probability of winning is also the same in both
equilibria. From Step 2, when resale is possible, the price setter makes
t h es a m eo ﬀer. In order to generate the same interim expected payoﬀs,
the probabilities of resale must be the same in both equilibria and we have
proved Corollary 3 (ii).
4. Comparative Statics
From Myerson (1981), in equilibrium, a couple of use values (v1,v 2) con-
tributes to the auctioneer’s expected revenues the (buyer’s) virtual use value
of the eventual owner. Without loss of generality, assume that ωb
1 (c) ≥
ωb
2 (c).T h e f u n c t i o n ψ =
¡
ωb
2
¢−1 ωb
1 then determines the ﬁnal allocation
that maximizes the expected revenues. Its deﬁnition is equivalent to (15)
below:
ω
b
2 (ψ(v)) = ω
b
1 (v),( 1 5 )
for all v in [c,d].F r o m t h i s d e ﬁnition, ψ(d)=d.
In Lemma 5 below, λ
s
ϕ (λ
b
ϕ), where ϕ = F
−1
2 F1,i st h eﬁnal equilibrium
allocation, deﬁned in Corollary 2 (Section 2), of the ﬁrst-price auction where
the auction winner (loser) is the price setter at resale.
Lemma 5: Let ωs
1,ωs
2,ωb
1,ωb
2 be strictly increasing. Let ϕ be equal to
F
−1
2 F1.A s s u m e ωb
1 (c) ≥ ωb
2 (c).T h e n , f o r a l l v in [c,d]:
λ
s
ϕ (v) > ( < )λ
b
ϕ (v) if and only if λ
s
ϕ (v) < ( > )ψ(v).
The proof is straightforward. Assume, for example, ϕ(v) >v .F r o m
Corollary 2 (Section 2) and ϕ = F
−1
2 F1,w eh a v eλ
s
ϕ (v)=ρs ¡
v,F
−1
2 F1 (v)
¢
23and v = ρb ¡
F
−1
1 F2
¡
λ
b
ϕ (v)
¢
,λ
b
ϕ (v)
¢
,t h a ti s :
v = λ
s
ϕ (v) −
F1 (v) − F2
¡
λ
s
ϕ (v)
¢
f2
¡
λ
s
ϕ (v)
¢ ,( 1 6 )
v = λ
b
ϕ (v)+
F2
¡
λ
b
ϕ (v)
¢
− F1 (v)
f1 (v)
.( 1 7 )
From the deﬁnitions of ωb
1,ωb
2,( 1 6 )i se q u i v a l e n tt o( 1 8 )b e l o w :
ω
b
2
¡
λ
s
ϕ (v)
¢
= ω
b
1 (v)+( 1− F1 (v))
Ã
1
f1 (v)
−
1
f2
¡
λ
s
ϕ (v)
¢
!
.( 1 8 )
If λ
s
ϕ (v) <ψ(v), (15) and (18) imply f1 (v) >f 2
¡
λ
s
ϕ (v)
¢
.S i n c e F1 (v)−
F2
¡
λ
s
ϕ (v)
¢
> 0,( 1 6 )t h e ni m p l i e s :
v<λ
s
ϕ (v) −
F1 (v) − F2
¡
λ
s
ϕ (v)
¢
f1 (v)
.(19)
Combining (19) with (17) and rearranging give:
λ
b
ϕ (v)+
F2
¡
λ
b
ϕ (v)
¢
f1 (v)
<λ
s
ϕ (v)+
F2
¡
λ
s
ϕ (v)
¢
f1 (v)
,
which immediately implies λ
b
ϕ (v) <λ
s
ϕ (v). L e m m a5i sp r o v e do n c ei ti s
noticed that all our implications are actually equivalences.
From Lemma 5, wherever the two allocations λ
b
ϕ and λ
s
ϕ diﬀer, λ
s
ϕ makes
the better choice by choosing the bidder with the higher virtual use value.
From Myerson (1981), higher expected revenues accrue to the auctioneer
under λ
s
ϕ and we have Corollary 4 below. Contrary to the case of resale
under complete information of Gupta and Lebrun (1999), there is in general
no relation of stochastic dominance between the bid distributions under the
24two bargaining procedures8.
Corollary 4: Let ωs
1,ωs
2,ωb
1,ω b
2 be strictly increasing. Let Rs (Rb)
be the auctioneer’s expected revenues at the unique regular equilibrium of
the ﬁrst-price auction when the auction winner (loser) is the price-setter at
resale. Then, we have:
R
s ≥ R
b.
The regular equilibrium of the second-price auction that is constructed
as in Theorem 1 from ϕ = F
−1
2 F1 allocates the item as the unique equi-
librium of the ﬁrst-price auction does and hence gives the same expected
revenues. In the symmetric case F1 = F2,t h ef u n c t i o n sλ
s
ϕ, λ
b
ϕ and ψ
are all equal to the identity function and the equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price
auction is an optimal mechanism. This is no longer the case in the asym-
metric case F1 6= F2. This point is most clearly made under the assumption
of diﬀerentiability of ψ. Assume that there exists v such that ϕ(v) >v .
Suppose λ
s
ϕ and ψ or, equivalently, from Lemma 5, λ
b
ϕ and ψ are identi-
cal over (ϕ− (v),ϕ + (v)). From (18) and (16), f1 (w)=f2 (ψ(w)) and
F1 (w) − F2 (ψ(w)) = f1 (w)(ψ(w) − w),f o ra l lw in (ϕ− (v),ϕ + (v)).B e -
cause its derivative then vanishes, (F1 (w) − F2 (ψ(w)))(ψ(w) − w) is con-
stant over this interval. However, this is impossible since it tends towards
zero at the extremities.
In the asymmetric case, there thus exists an interval where λ
x
ϕ is every-
where diﬀerent from ψ, for all x = s,b. By slightly moving ϕ over this
interval, while keeping it continuous and strictly increasing, towards and
away from ψ, λ
x
ϕ will move in the same direction and we have Corollary 5
below.
8From Section 2, the bids are identically distributed according to Gx such that
(Gx)
−1 (q)=ρx ¡
F
−1
1 (q),F
−1
2 (q)
¢
, for all q in [0,1]. Consider the case where there
exists q,i,j such that F
−1
i (q) <F
−1
j (q), Fi is strictly convex over
£
F
−1
i (q),F
−1
j (q)
¤
,
and Fj is strictly concave over the same interval. Then, the deﬁnitions of ρs and ρb
easily imply ρb ¡
F
−1
1 (q),F
−1
2 (q)
¢
>
F
−1
1 (q)+F
−1
2 (q)
2 >ρ s ¡
F
−1
1 (q),F
−1
2 (q)
¢
,a n dGs does
not stochastically dominate Gb.
25Corollary 5: Let ωs
1,ωs
2,ωb
1,ωb
2 be strictly increasing and let ψ be dif-
ferentiable. Then:
(i) When F1 = F2, the unique regular equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auc-
tion gives revenues equal to the maximum revenues at regular equilibria of
the second-price auction.
(ii) When F1 6= F2, the revenues from the unique regular equilibrium of
the ﬁrst-price auction are strictly smaller than the revenues at some equilibria
of the second-price auction and strictly larger than the revenues at some
others.
5. Conclusion
We established a link between the common value model and the inde-
pendent private value model with resale. From this link, we characterized
an inﬁnity of equilibria of the second-price auction with resale and a unique
equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction with resale. For every equilibrium of
any auction without disclosure of the bids, we constructed an equivalent equi-
librium of the auction with disclosure of the bids. All our equilibria of the
second-price auction with bid disclosure satisfy a no-regret property: after
learning the bids, no bidder regrets his own.
We showed an equilibrium of the second-price auction that gives the same
expected revenues as the equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction. With hetero-
geneous bidders, we showed equilibria of the second-price auction that give
strictly higher expected revenues.
For the ﬁrst-price auction, we proved that the expected revenues are
higher when the price setter at resale is the auction winner.
Appendix 1
26Lemma A1: Let x,y be s or b a n ds u c ht h a tx 6= y.L e t ω
y
1 and ω
y
2
be strictly increasing. Let β1,β2 be regular bidding functions and let ux
1,u x
2
be deﬁned as in Lemma 1. Let i,j =1 ,2 be such that i 6= j.T h e n , f o r a l l
bi ≥ c and vi in [c,d], the function e ux
i (vj)=ux
i
¡
vi,v j;bi,βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
of
vj is continuous with respect to vj at vj = αj (bi) and almost all other vj in
[c,d].
Proof: From the deﬁnition of ux
i in Lemma 1 and the continuity of ρx
and αi, e ux
i is continuous at vj if vj 6= ρx
i (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))).A s s u m e vj
in [c,d] is such that vj = αj (bi) and vj = ρx
i (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))). Then,
vj = vi. Since the function e ux
i always lies between vi and vj,i ti sc o n t i n u o u s
if vj = vi and Lemma A1 follows. ||
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof of (i): Through the change of variables wj = αj (bi), (5) implies
wj ∈ arg max
w0
j∈[c,d]
Z wj
e
u
x
i
¡
vi,v j;βj
¡
w
0
j
¢
,βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
dFj (vj),( A 1 . 1 )
for all wj in [c,d].F o r a l l w0
j in [c,d], the objective function in (A1.1), as an
integral, is absolutely continuous with respect to wj and, from Lemma A1
and the continuity of fj, the integrand is continuous with respect to vj almost
everywhere in [c,d]. Consequently, the derivative of the objective function at
wj exists and is equal to ux
i
¡
vi,v j;βj
¡
w0
j
¢
,βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
fj (wj), for almost
all wj in [c,d].S i n c e ux
i and fj are bounded, the assumptions of a variant9
of Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) are satisﬁed. From this variant
and the change of variables wj = αj (bi), (i) follows for all bi in
£
c,βj (d)
¤
.
(i) reduces to the trivial equality 0=0when x = b and bi ≥ βj (d).
9This is the variant (which can be proved as Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002)
from their Theorem 1) where the requirement that f (x,.) be diﬀerentiable for all x ∈ X
is replaced by the requirement that f (x∗ (t),.) be diﬀerentiable, for any selection x∗ (.) ∈
X∗ (.) and almost all t ∈ (0,1).
27When x = s, (5) implies that the objective function in (5) is constant with
respect to b0
i ≥ βj (d),f o ra l lbi ≥ βj (d). (i) then follows.
P r oo fo f( i i ) : I fα1 (b)=α2 (b), Lemma 1 implies ux
i (α1 (b),α 2 (b);b,b;β1,β2)=
αi (b).S i n c e ρx (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) = αi (b), (ii) follows. If α1 (b) 6= α2 (b),
min(α1 (b),α 2 (b)) <ρ x (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) < max(α1 (b),α 2 (b)) and (ii) follows
from Lemma 1.
Proof of (iii): Wen x = s (b), ux
i
¡
vi,α j (b);b,b;βi,βj
¢
is, from Lemma
1, equal to ρx
i (vi,α j (b)) if vi <(>)αj (b),t oαj (b) if vi = αj (b),a n dt o
min
¡
vi,ρ x
j (αj (b),max(αj (b),α i (b)))
¢
(max
¡
vi,ρ x
j (αj (b),min(αj (b),α i (b)))
¢
)
if vi >(<)αj (b). (iii) follows. ||
Appendix 2
Lemma A2: Let i,j =1 ,2 be such that i 6= j.I f ωs
j is strictly increasing,
then the left-hand partial derivative
∂l
∂viρs (v,v) exists and
∂l
∂vi
ρ
s (v,v)=
1
2
,
for all v in (c,d].I f ωb
j is strictly increasing, then the right-hand partial
derivative ∂r
∂viρb (v,v) exists and
∂r
∂vi
ρ
b (v,v)=
1
2
for all v in [c,d).
Proof: We prove the statement about ρs. The statement about ρb can
be similarly proved. Let v1, v2 be such that c<v i <v j ≤ d,w i t hi 6= j.
Subtracting the deﬁnition (1) of ρ(v1,v 2) from vj and dividing by vj − vi,
we ﬁnd:
1=
vj − ρ(v1,v 2)
vj − vi
µ
1+
1
fj (ρ(v1,v 2))
Fj(vj) − Fj(ρ(v1,v 2))
vj − ρ(v1,v 2)
¶
.
28From the continuity of fj at vj and the continuity of ρ, fj (ρ(v1,v 2)) tends
towards fj(vj),w h e nvi tends towards vj from below. Since the derivative
of Fj at vj exists and is equal to fj (vj), the limit of the ratio
Fj(vj)−Fj(ρ(v1,v2))
vj−ρ(v1,v2)
is equal to fj (vj). Consequently, the factor between parentheses in the
equation above tends towards 2 and the lemma follows. ||
Proof that (11) is a cumulative distribution function:
As indicated in the main text, we only need to prove that (11) tends to-
wards one as v2 tends towards ϕ+ (v). Since it is well known that the integral
R ϕ+(v)
ρs(α1(b2),α2(b2))
1
ϕ+(v)−wdw diverges and since
w−α1(ρs(α1(.),α2(.))−1(w))
ϕ+(v)−w = −1+
ϕ+(v)−α1(ρs(α1(.),α2(.))−1(w))
ϕ+(v)−w , we will be done once we prove that
ϕ+(v)−w
ϕ+(v)−α1(ρs(α1(.),α2(.))−1(w))
is bounded away from zero, as w tends towards ϕ+ (v) from below, or, equiva-
lently, through the change of variables v1 = α1
¡
ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.))
−1 (w)
¢
,t h a t
ϕ+(v)−ρs(v1,ϕ(v1))
ϕ+(v)−v1 is bounded away from zero, as v1 tends towards ϕ+ (v) from
below.
However, this last ratio is equal to the sum
ϕ+(v)−ρs(v1,ϕ+(v))
ϕ+(v)−v1 +
ρs(v1,ϕ+(v))−ρs(v1,ϕ(v1))
ϕ+(v)−v1 .
The second term is nonnegative and, from
∂l
∂v2ρs (ϕ+ (v),ϕ + (v)) = 1
2 (Lemma
A2), the ﬁrst term tends towards 1
2. Consequently, it is bounded away from
zero and the proof is complete.
The proof for the other bargaining procedure is similar and makes use of
∂r
∂v2ρb (ϕ− (v),ϕ − (v)) = 1
2. ||
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